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Abstract 
This study analyses how public R&D financing impacts companies. Our main goal is to study whether 
public and private R&D financing are substitutes or complements, and whether this impact differs 
between financially constrained and unconstrained companies. Our company-level panel data cover 
the period from 1996 to 2002. The statistical method employed in the research takes into account the 
possibility that receiving public support may be an endogenous factor. Our results suggest that public 
R&D financing does not crowd out privately financed R&D. Instead, receiving a positive decision to 
obtain public R&D funds increases privately financed R&D. Furthermore, our results suggest that this 
additionality effect is bigger in large firms than in small firms.  
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1. Introduction 
The creation of new knowledge is often seen to play an important role as a source of economic growth 
(Romer, 1990). Furthermore, as a result of the widely accepted view, the social return of R&D is 
greater than the private return, thus unsurprisingly the public sector in almost all industrial countries 
tries to foster technological change by using a variety of instruments, such as R&D loans and 
subsidies, national R&D laboratories and tax cuts. This study focuses on the issue of whether public 
R&D funding complements or substitutes private R&D and whether this impact differs between 
financially constrained and unconstrained companies.  
Two of the most often mentioned rationales for government support are both based on the market 
imperfections that lead to underinvestment in private R&D. First, the output of R&D is knowledge or 
know-how that usually cannot be kept secret. Owing to the diffusion of the results of R&D beyond the 
control of the investors, the social return of R&D exceeds its private return (e.g. Arrow, 1962). 
Another rationale for government funding relies on capital market imperfections such as informational 
asymmetries. As a consequence of these imperfections, it may be costly or difficult to use external 
financing for R&D investment. Hence, in some cases the capital market restrains or blocks the 
innovativeness of companies.  
Even though public R&D funding has widely accepted theoretical roots, the question arises as to 
whether R&D policy really stimulates the total R&D activity of the private sector. Public R&D 
funding increases the total R&D expenditure only if the grants encourage firms to undertake projects 
that would otherwise be unrealised or on a smaller scale. Otherwise, subsidised firms use public 
funding as a substitute source of financing. In sum, it is an open empirical question whether public 
R&D funding really complements private R&D and thus increases the total R&D expenditure. There 
is an extensive empirical literature focusing on this issue (for a survey, see David, Hall & Toole, 
2000). The majority of the studies have reported complementary effects but substitute effects have 
also been found. Recent papers (see Klette, Moen & Griliches, 2000 and Wallsten, 2000), however, 
have questioned the results of previous studies. According to the criticism, the majority of the 
statistical analyses ignore the possibility that grants are endogenous. In other words, public and private 
R&D expenditure are correlated because companies with an increase in private spending receive 
subsidies – not because subsidies cause private R&D to increase. 
The focus of this study is to empirically examine the impact of public R&D funding on private R&D. 
We pay special attention to capital market imperfections by examining what kind of effect financial 
constraint has on the relationship between public and private funded R&D. Because of the intangible 
and uncertain nature of R&D investment, external finance opportunities for inventive activities are 
potentially restrictive. This argument suggests that firms primarily use internal finance to fund their 
R&D investment. It also implies that public R&D subsidies and loans might be attractive sources of 
finance. If a firm suffers financial constraint in funding its R&D projects, it is less probable that this 
firm uses public R&D funding only as a substitute source of financing.  
Contrary to most previous studies, our unique panel data enables us to distinguish companies that have 
applied for and obtained public funding, applied for and obtained only part of what they applied for, 
applied for funding and been rejected, and firms that have not applied for funding. 2 | JYRKI ALI-YRKKÖ 
 
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 includes relevant theoretical and empirical 
literature concerning the relationship between public and private R&D funding. Section 3 describes 
the data. Section 4 gives an empirical analysis and results. Section 5 contains a summary and 
concluding remarks.  
2. Literature  review 
The main argument for public R&D funding is that the social return of R&D is higher than the private 
return, and thus from the perspective of the national economy firms under-invest in R&D. 
Underinvestment occurs because imperfect capital markets prevent companies from investing in all the 
R&D projects with positive net present value (NPV), or because the results of R&D spill over to other 
organisations.  
Public R&D funding may impact private R&D through various direct and indirect channels. 
According to Lach (2000), at least three impact channels can be identified. First, public R&D funding 
can be seen as lowering the private cost of an R&D project and making an unprofitable project 
profitable. Second, if R&D infrastructure, equipment or other R&D facilities are bought with an R&D 
subsidy, then the fixed costs of other R&D projects are lowered. Third, in some cases know-how or 
knowledge developed in subsidised projects diffuse to other projects, improving their probability of 
success. Therefore, public R&D funding potentially increases the current and future R&D activities of 
companies. 
Even though public R&D funding has several potential positive impacts, its real effect depends 
heavily on whether public R&D funding actually augments the total R&D expenditure of firms. If 
public funding replaces private R&D, then the public R&D policy is inappropriate. A number of 
empirical studies applying various degrees of data aggregation have addressed this issue. While some 
studies have used macro-level data (e.g. Levy, 1990 and Guellec & van Pottelsberghe, 2000), others 
have utilised plant-level (e.g. Lichtenberg, 1984) or firm-level datasets. As the possibilities for macro-
econometric models to take into account heterogeneities between firms are limited, we focus on 
empirical studies where micro-level data has been utilised.  
Irwin & Klenow (1995) evaluate the Sematech programme by the US government, which was a 
research consortium consisting of large US semiconductor companies. Findings of the study suggest 
that public funding decreases companies’ R&D expenditure might be the result of eliminating 
overlapping R&D efforts. Contrary to the Sematech programme, the Small Business Innovation 
Research (SBIR) programme was directed at small companies in order to stimulate their technological 
innovations. The results by Lerner (1999) indicate that the subsidised firms in the areas studied that 
have a high degree of venture-capital activity increase employment and sales more rapidly than other 
firms do. The study by Branstetter & Sakakibara (1998) focuses on the performance of heavily 
subsidised Japanese research consortia. The results suggest that frequent participation in R&D 
consortia has a positive impact on firms’ R&D expenditure and research productivity. The evidence 
from Norway (Klette & Moen, 1998) suggests that public R&D funding does not replace private R&D 
efforts, and that subsidies do not increase their privately financed R&D either. Moreover, Klette & 
Moen find that subsidies stimulate R&D expenditure particularly by small and large firms as opposed 
to medium-sized firms. The recent literature (see e.g. Wallsten, 2000 and Klette, Moen & Griliches, 
2000) has questioned the results of numerous previous studies with an argument that only a few 
studies have explicitly taken into account the potential endogeneity of public funding.  
Wallsten (2000) examines the same SBIR programme as Lerner (1999) but points out the importance 
of controlling for the endogeneity of grants. Using the instrumental variable approach, Wallsten 
reports an (almost) complete crowding-out effect. Busom (1999) analyses 154 Spanish firms of which 
roughly 50% had received public subsidies. Owing to the data limitations, Busom is unable to make an 
exact estimate of crowding-out or complementary effects. Nevertheless, her endogeneity-controlled 
analyses suggest that 41 companies spend more on R&D than they would have without the subsidy 
and 29 firms would have spent at least as much as in the case of no subsidy. Czarnitzki & Fier (2002) IMPACT OF PUBLIC R&D FINANCING ON PRIVATE R&D | 3 
 
examine 210 German firms operating in the service sector. Applying a non-parametric matching 
approach, they find evidence that public funding has fostered the private innovation efforts of firms. 
By analysing more than 1,600 French firms, Duguet (2003) concludes that no significant substitution 
effect appears. Similar results have also been reported by Almus & Czarnitzki (2002), Hussinger 
(2003) and Gonzalez, Jaumandreu & Pazo (2004). The evidence from Israel (Lach, 2000) suggests that 
subsidies do not completely crowd out private R&D. Lehto (2000) analyses the effect of public 
funding on the total R&D spending of Finnish plants. By taking into account the potential endogeneity 
of public funding, he concludes that publicly funded R&D does not crowd out private R&D. Toivanen 
& Niininen (2000) apply a simultaneous-equations approach and find evidence that Finnish firms with 
moderate cash flow add their own R&D expenditure as a response to a subsidy but when the cash flow 
is big enough, this relationship disappears. 
This short survey demonstrates that existing empirical studies do not allow for a definitive conclusion 
regarding the sign of the relationships between publicly and privately funded R&D. Hence, it is still an 
open empirical question as to whether public R&D funding increases or decreases privately funded 
R&D. In order to answer this question, more research with more comprehensive datasets is needed.  
To our knowledge, no existing study in this field has focused on the role or impact of financial 
constraint (see, however, Toivanen & Niininen, 2000). Our purpose is to extend the public R&D 
funding literature by following the fixed investment and financial constraint literature (see e.g. 
Fazzari, Hubbard & Petersen, 1988) and by studying the relationship between financial constraint and 
the impact of public R&D funding.  
3.  Description of the data 
Our data is a unique company-level dataset consisting of Finnish companies operating in the 
technology industry. The companies within the technology industry operate mainly in the electronics 
and electro-technical, mechanical engineering and metals sectors.  
Three separate data sources have been merged, making it possible to take into account a large set of 
explanatory variables. The R&D dataset is based on an investment survey conducted by The 
Confederation of Finnish Industry and Employers. Into this data, we have added the information of 
companies’ financial statements provided by Balance Consulting and Talouselämä magazine. Finally, 
the data concerning the public R&D funding from the Finnish Technology Agency (Tekes) has been 
merged together with the two datasets mentioned. 
In contrast to many previous studies, we are able to distinguish firms that 1) have applied for and 
obtained public funding; b) applied for and obtained only part of the amount they applied for; c) 
applied for funding and been rejected; and d) firms that have not applied for public funding. Thus our 
dataset allows us to distinguish between firms that applied for funding but were denied and those that 
did not apply.  
With respect to the public funding variable, the choice between the subsidy granted and actually paid 
had to be made. While both alternatives include advantages and disadvantages, we follow the study by 
Meeusen & Janssens (2001) and use subsidies granted.
1 Our unbalanced database consists of 441 
companies with various time series (Table 1).
2  
                                                 
1 In order to keep it simple, in the rest of the paper we have used public funding and public funding granted as 
synonyms.  
2 To control the potential bias caused by outliers, 5% of the biggest firms in terms of employment are excluded 
from the sample. 4 | JYRKI ALI-YRKKÖ 
 
Table 1. The structure of the panel data by observations per company 
Number  of  annual  observations  3 4 5 6 7 
Number of companies  119  109  65  73  75 
Share of the companies (%)  27.0  24.7  14.7  16.6  17.0 
Companies with single or two observations available are excluded from the sample, thus our data 
includes only those companies with three or more annual observations (Table 1). As can be seen from 
the table, we have at least four observations for more than 90% of the companies. Table 2 describes 
the data.  
Table 2. Descriptive statistics (€ millions) 
Count Mean Median Standard 
deviation Minimum Maximum
        
Total R&D  1640  1.00 0.35 1.63 0.001  15.59
Private R&D  1640  0.92 0.30 1.56 0  15.59
Public funding (paid)  1640  0.086 0.015 0.195 0  2.04
Net sales (€ millions)  1640  42.79 10.78 112.96 0.15  1272.6
Operating profit  1640  4.25 0.93 13.34 -67.67  261.35
Long-term debt  1640  4.62 0.94 13.82 0  331.75
(Long-term debt)2  1640 212.27 0.88 2,832.21 0 11,0057.3
R&D intensity  1640   0.07 0.028 0.17 0.00006  2.66
Operating profit (%)  1640  0.086 0.101 0.23 -5.5  2.03
Our data consists of a pooled sample of companies over the seven-year period from 1996 to 2002. In 
Table 3 we report the annual breakdown of our sample concerning the number and the share of 
companies that have received public funding. 
Table 3. R&D and public funding 
  Number of firms  % of firms receiving subsidy  Mean (subsidy/total R&D) ratio 
for firms with subsidy > 0 
1996 198  16.7  0.16 
1997 311  36.7  0.23 
1998 363  51.2  0.28 
1999 361  54.5  0.33 
2000 357  55.5  0.29 
2001 278  53.6  0.30 
2002 213  52.6  0.31 
All years  441  45.8  0.27 
 
On average, nearly half of the companies in our data have received public funding. This share has 
remained rather stable during the period 1998-2002. Among the supported companies, the average 
share of public funding of the total R&D expenditure is 27%. Even though the most recent three years 
indicate a slightly increasing share of public funding, it is uncertain whether this change is permanent. 
Thus, while this share has varied during the period 1996-2002, no clear trend can be observed.  IMPACT OF PUBLIC R&D FINANCING ON PRIVATE R&D | 5 
 
The existing literature suggests that R&D investments suffer from imperfections in the capital market 
(see e.g. Hall, 1992, Hao & Jaffe, 1993, Himmelberg and Petersen, 1994 and Hyytinen & Toivanen, 
2002). As a consequence of these imperfections, some firms face financial constraint implying that in 
these firms the role of public R&D funding is potentially different than in some other firms. We 
closely follow the fixed investment literature and categorise the firms employing different criteria to 
identify firms that are likely to face either higher costs of external finance or difficulty in getting 
external finance. Firm size and indebtedness are used as a priori criteria to classify firms that 
potentially suffer financial constraints and those who do not. Out of our three classifications, two are 
based on firm size and one is based on indebtedness. Owing to capital market imperfections, such as 
informational asymmetries (see e.g. Greenwald, Stiglitz & Weiss, 1984), small firms are more likely 
to face financial constraints. Firms with a high level of debt, in turn, have a greater probability of 
bankruptcy, which can raise the cost of borrowing or negatively affect the availability of credit. To 
classify firms, we use the following criteria. In classification 1, 10% of the sample has been classified 
as small firms (in terms of employment) and in classification 2, 25% are small. In classification 3, a 
firm is considered an indebted firm (in year t) if its interest rate expenditure exceeds its operating 
profit. Descriptive statistics by classifications are shown in Table 4. 
Table 4. Descriptive statistics (means and two-tailed t-tests for means) by firm size and indebtedness 
 
 
Classification 1 
10% of firms are classified 
as small firms 
Classification 2 
25% of firms are classified 
as small firms 
Classification 3 
Indebtedness 
 Small  Large Small Large Indebted  Non-
indebted 
Total R&D (€ millions)  0.18 1.06*** 0.24 1.2*** 1.13  1.00
Private R&D (€ millions)  0.146 0.974*** 0.20 1.10*** 0.92  0.98
Public funding (granted) (€ 
millions)  0.06 0.13** 0.07 0.13*** 0.22  0.11***
Public funding (paid) 
(€ millions)  0.04 0.09*** 0.05 0.10*** 0.15 0.08***
Net sales (€ millions)  1.76 45.83*** 2.37 53.25*** 27.79  44.32
Profit (€ millions)  0.162  4.55*** 0.24 5.28*** -2.29  4.75***
Long term debt 
(€ millions)  2.59 4.77 1.22 5.50*** 6.16 4.58
(Long term debt) 2 
(€ millions) 
130.28 218.34 44.22 255.73 229.17 214.46
Total R&D/net sales   0.24 0.06*** 0.18 0.04*** 0.27 0.06***
Public funding (paid) /Total 
R&D  0.26 0.15*** 0.28 0.13*** 0.28 0.15***
Profit (%)  -0.06  0.1*** 0.03 0.10*** -0.29  0.11***
*** = significant at the 1% level;** = significant at the 5% level; and * = significant at the 10% level. 
Note: As previously noted, we define a firm as ‘indebted’ if its interest rate expenditure exceeds its operating profit.  
Table 4 reveals some interesting differences between the groups. According to classifications 1 and 2, 
small firms seem to invest more in R&D (relative to net sales) than larger firms. Similarly, indebted 
firms invest more in R&D than the reference group. These differences are statistically significant at 
the better than 1% level. The table also indicates that small firms obtain more public R&D funding 
(relative to the total R&D) than large firms. Correspondingly, there seems to be a similar difference 
between indebted and non-indebted firms. Yet without more rigorous analysis, it is not easy to reach 
any conclusions about the relationship between R&D, public R&D funding and financial constraint. 6 | JYRKI ALI-YRKKÖ 
 
4. Empirical  analysis   
Our main interest is to examine whether the public R&D funding crowds out or stimulates privately 
financed R&D. To analyse the impact we use privately financed R&D as a dependent variable. We 
follow the existing literature and add several control variables to our regressions. To capture the size 
effects, net sales is added to the model (see e.g. Klette & Moen, 1998). Net sales might also serve as a 
proxy for expected market demand (see Swenson, 1992). As described in the literature review, both 
theoretical and previous empirical studies suggest that financial factors affect R&D investment. To 
control the effect of financial variables, profit or cash flow (Toivanen & Niininen, 2000 and Klette & 
Moen, 1998), debt (Toivanen & Niininen, 2000) and its squared term (see Hall, 1991) have been 
included in the regression equation.  
Our baseline specification for the estimation is: 
+ + + = −1 , 2 1 _ t i it it Y PUBLIC PRIV RD β β α  
it t i t i t i v B B + + + Π − − −
2
1 , 5 1 , 4 1 , 3 β β β ,         (1) 
where subscripts i and t are the firm and time indexes respectively, it PRIV RD_  is the firm’s private 
funded R&D,  it PUBLIC  is the amount of public R&D funding,  1 , − t i Y  is sales,  1 , − Π t i  is profit,  1 , − t i B  
is long-term debt, 
2
1 , − t i B  is squared long-term debt, and  it v  is an error term.  
Our estimation strategy proceeds as follows. First, we estimate the model (1) by using the ordinary 
least-squares (OLS) method. This method, however, ignores the possibility that public funding is an 
endogenous variable. To control the potential endogeneity, the instrument variable (IV) method is 
used. An appropriate instrument correlates with the endogenous public funding variable but is not 
correlated with unobserved factors that have an impact on the dependent variable. According to 
Lichtenberg (1988) and Wallsten (2000), one ideal instrument is the value of funds that are potentially 
awardable to firm i in year t.  
Following Wallsten (2000), for firms that have applied for public funding we define the instrument, 
it BUDGET , as follows:  
( ) at at it T TEKESBUDGE AWARD BUDGET × = ,         (2) 
where subscripts i,  a, and t refer to firm, industry and year respectively.
3 The dummy variable 
at AWARD  is given a value 1 if company i operating in industry a obtains public funding in the year. 
The variable  at T TEKESBUDGE  is Tekes’s budget for industry a in year t. Similarly, for a firm that 
applied in year t but was rejected,  it BUDGET  is defined as Tekes’s budget for industry a in year t.  
For firms that have never applied for Tekes funding, the calculation of  it BUDGET  is more 
complicated. In this case, we have first calculated the probability of receiving funding if the firm had 
applied for it. The probability has been calculated by dividing the number of firms in industry a that 
received public funding by the total number of firms that applied for it in industry a. Then this 
probability,  ) ( at AWARD p , has been multiplied by Tekes’s budget ( at T TEKESBUDGE ) for 
industry a in year t (equation 3).  
( ) at at it T TEKESBUDGE AWARD p BUDGET × = ) (     (3) 
                                                 
3 Approximately one-third of our sample companies operate in the electronics industry and two-thirds operate in 
the metal and engineering industry. IMPACT OF PUBLIC R&D FINANCING ON PRIVATE R&D | 7 
 
In addition to the  it BUDGET  instrument, we also use another instrument. Presumably, the amount 
that a company has applied for ( it APPLIED ) in year t correlates with the amount granted to the 
company in the same year. But it is hard to see why  it APPLIED  should correlate with the unobserved 
determinants of private R&D, conditional on the actual R&D funding received.
4 Table 5 reports the 
results of OLS and instrument variable (IV) regressions of equation (1). 
Table 5. Effects of public funding on private R&D 
  (a) (b) (c)  (d)
  Pooled OLS IV Pooled OLS  IV
(Public funding)t 
.6169116*** 
(.1522762)
.8645195*** 
(.2493533) –  –
(Public funding)t-1  – – 1.021892*** 
(.1753828) 
1.255741*** 
(.2348298)
Salest-1 
.0034151** 
(.0015203)
.0032901 
(.0022243)
.0032093** 
(.0013955)  .003091   (.0020313)
Profitt-1 
0.0265798* 
(.0157024)
.0264262 
(.0183004)
.0278918* 
(.0146042) 
.0281044* 
(.0171702)
Long-term debtt-1 
.0707117*** 
(.0121451)
.0689176*** 
(.019879)
.0715736*** 
(.0118566) 
.070748*** 
(.0189163)
(Long-term debt) 2
t-1 
-.0007477*** 
(.0001695)
-.0007266*** 
(.0002501)
-.0007865*** 
(.0001704) 
-.0007833*** 
(.0002512)
Constant  .3436345*** 
(.0764625)
.3190393*** 
(.0829895)
.3339273*** 
(.0751646) 
.3176829*** 
(.0815247)
+ Year dummies  – – –  –
Number of observations  1640 1640 1640  1640
F-test (joint)  19.10 11.14 22.88  15.99
      P-value  <0.001 <0.001 <0.001  <0.001
R
2  0.39 0.39 0.41  0.41
*** = significant at the 1% level; ** = significant at the 5% level; and * = significant at the 10% level. 
Notes:  Heteroskedasticity-corrected standard errors are in parentheses.  
Instruments (column b): year dummies, BUDGET(t), APPLIED(t), Sales(t-1), Profit(t-1), Long-term debt(t-1), Long-
term debt2(t-1). Instruments (column d): year dummies, BUDGET(t-1), APPLIED(t-1), Sales(t-1), Profit(t-1), Long-
term debt(t-1), Long-term debt2(t-1).  
F-test = tests the hypothesis that all coefficients excluding constant are zero. 
According to the OLS estimation (columns a and c in Table 5), the coefficient for the public funding 
in both time t and t-1 are positive and statistically significant at the 1% level, suggesting additionality 
between public and privately funded R&D. Moreover, the coefficients of sales, profit and debt are also 
positive and statistically significant. 
These estimates, however, might be biased because of the presence of endogeneity of public funding 
variables. To control the potential endogeneity of public funding, IV estimation was carried out 
                                                 
4 We also estimated our models by using only BUDGET as an instrument (see section 4.2 on robustness tests). 8 | JYRKI ALI-YRKKÖ 
 
(columns b and d).
5 Again, the public funding has a positive and statistically significant impact on 
private R&D. Interestingly, the coefficients of public funding in IV estimations are even higher than in 
OLS estimations. Hence in contrast to Wallsten’s study (2000), controlling endogeneity does not 
change the positive impact of public funding. The results of IV models (columns b and d) also suggest 
that debt has a statistically significant (non-linear) positive effect on private R&D. Furthermore, the 
results (weakly) indicate that profit increases private R&D.  
In sum, all regressions in Table 5 indicate that public R&D funding does not crowd out privately 
financed R&D. Instead, they suggest that receiving a positive decision to obtain public R&D finance 
increases private R&D efforts.  
4.1  Does liquidity constraint matter? 
Next, we ask whether there are differences in the impact of public funding between financially 
constrained and unconstrained firms. To do this we follow the fixed investment literature and use a 
priori criteria to classify our firms into constrained and unconstrained firms as introduced in section 3.  
We employ three distinct methods to categorise our firms and include a dummy variable (=1 for 
financially constrained firms) denoted by D and its interaction with the regressors into the model. In 
the regressions that follow in Table 6, the instrument variable method has been used.  
The first seven coefficients relate to the sub-sample with no financial constraint, while the remaining 
seven coefficients estimate the difference of the coefficients on each variable across the two sub-
samples.  
The results of the first two columns (a and b) indicate that the additionality effect of public funding on 
privately funded R&D is clearly smaller in small firms (10% of firms are small) than larger firms. The 
statistic of the F-test (not reported in the table) also suggests that the coefficient of public funding is 
different in small firms and large firms. Nevertheless, even though the impact of public  funding 
(.877897-.865261) on private R&D is close to zero in small firms (column a), the result does not alter 
the conclusion that the impact of public funding on the total R&D of small firms is positive. When 
25% of the firms are classified as small firms, the estimation echoes the result that the additionality 
effect of public R&D funding is bigger in large firms than in small firms (column c).  
Another interesting result is that while debt seems to increase the private R&D of large firms, it 
decreases the private R&D of small firms. In columns (e) and (f), firms with poor interest coverage 
have been defined as financially constrained. Again, the results indicate that public funding increases 
private R&D efforts. All the interaction terms are statistically insignificant, however, indicating that 
the coefficients are the same across the two sub-groups.  
It is notable that we have used three distinct methods to find firms that potentially suffer financial 
constraints, and none of the estimations suggest that public R&D finance crowds out the privately 
funded R&D of non-financially constrained firms. Instead, the additionality effect seems to be even 
larger in large firms that a priori were classified as non-financially constrained firms. One potential 
explanation is that small firms are partially financially constrained. Thus, they can not afford to 
increase privately funded R&D as much as larger firms.  
The important implication of our results is that our evidence does not support the view that the public 
sector should just finance those firms that suffer financial constraints. 
                                                 
5 Our first-stage estimations (see Appendix) suggest that BUDGET and APPLIED are positively and statistically 
significantly correlated with public funding. IMPACT OF PUBLIC R&D FINANCING ON PRIVATE R&D | 9 
 
Table 6. The impact of public funding and financial constraint  
  (Model 1) 
Classification 1 
(Model 2) 
Classification 2 
(Model 3) 
Classification 3 
  (10% are small)  (25% are small)  (Indebtedness) 
 (a) (b) (c) (d) (e)  (f) 
Public fundingt  .877897*** 
(.253481)  –  .87774***   
(.260566)  –  .903688*** 
(.282489)  – 
Public fundingt-1 –  1.23882***   
(.2360302)  –  1.25001***   
(.2432595)  –  1.2339***   
(.259894) 
Sales t-1  .0030721  
(.0021823) 
.002931   
(.0020016) 
.0030188   
(.0021537) 
.0028732   
(.0019714) 
.0029302   
(.0029204) 
.067783   
(.373972) 
Profit t-1  .0262963 
(.0180183) 
.0279744*   
(.0169659) 
.0260813   
(.0177126) 
.027795*   
(.0166681) 
.0271564   
(.0253968) 
.0273299   
(.023248) 
Debt t-1  .072421*** 
(.0200561) 
.073321***   
(.0193588) 
.067719***   
(.0204284) 
.068864***   
(.0197719) 
.075242***   
(.0210142) 
.0757***   
(.020313) 
(Debt) 2
 t-1 
-.000741*** 
(.0002446) 
-.000793***  
(.0002485) 
-.000691***   
(.0002466) 
-.000745***   
(.0002514) 
-.000759***   
(.0002485) 
-.00081***   
(.000253) 
Constant  0.33908*** 
(.08795) 
0.3423***   
(.08632) 
0.41896***  
(.09904) 
0.41273***  
(0.09718) 
0.50582*** 
(.11247) 
0.4822*** 
(.1069) 
D (Dummy)  -.179583*** 
(.0606504) 
-.196499***   
(.0545213) 
-.205937***   
(.0677567) 
-.211552***   
(.0623196) 
.3235486*   
(.1767483) 
.193458   
(.14305) 
D*Public fundingt  -.865261*** 
(.2750605)  –  -.503564***   
(.3057745)  –  -.4652494  
(.3462708)  – 
D*Public fundingt-1 – -.5497394*   
(.334249)  –  -.7757654   
(.3151758)  – – 
D*Sales t-1  -.0221961 
(.0233341) 
-.0105359   
(.0167402) 
-.0085331   
(.0145095) 
.0048367   
(.0134761) 
.0066264   
(.0073164) 
.007678   
(.006625) 
D*Profit t-1  -.0323552  
(.0968891) 
-.0557169   
(.0672118) 
–.167965***   
(.0560099) 
–.173178***   
(.0476063) 
.0779936   
(.0911393) 
.1064701   
(.08474) 
D*Debt t-1  -.132649*** 
(.0210677) 
-.133122***   
(.0204472) 
-.124455***   
(.0324514) 
-.109479***   
(.0313567) 
-.0095546   
(.0483977) 
-.0008141   
(.047535) 
D*(Debt) 2
 t-1 
.001819***  
(.0002711) 
.001872***   
(.000273) 
.001676***   
(.0004818) 
.0015***   
(.0004721) 
-.0003322   
(.0006905) 
-.0003741   
(.000686) 
+  year  dummies         
Number of 
observations  1640 1640 1640 1640 1610  1610 
F-test  (joint)  44.63 56.97 24.25 33.78 10.35  12.3 
      P-value  <0.001  <0.001  <0.001  <0.001  <0.001  <0.001 
*** = significant at the 1% level; ** = significant at the 5% level; and * = significant at the 10% level. 
Notes:  Heteroskedasticity-corrected standard errors are in parentheses. 
Instruments, columns a, c and e: BUDGET(t), APPLIED (t), Sales(t-1), Profit(t-1), Long-term debt(t-1), Long-term 
debt
2(t-1), dummy*BUDGET(t), dummy*APPLIED (t), dummy*Sales(t-1), dummy* Profit(t-1), dummy* Long-term 
debt(t-1), dummy* Long-term debt2(t-1). 
Instruments, columns b, d and f: BUDGET(t-1), APPLIED (t-1), Sales(t-1), Profit(t-1), Long-term debt(t-1), Long-
term debt2(t-1), dummy*BUDGET(t-1), dummy*APPLIED (t-1), dummy*Sales(t-1), dummy* Profit(t-1), dummy* 
Long-term debt(t-1), dummy* Long-term debt2(t-1). 
F-test = tests the hypothesis that all coefficients excluding constant are zero. 10 | JYRKI ALI-YRKKÖ 
 
4.2 Robustness  tests 
Next, we performed a number of robustness tests. To save space we do not report these tests in detail.  
Robustness test 1. To test to what extent our results depend on the choice of estimating the model by 
using both BUDGET and APPLIED as instruments, we re-ran the regressions (Tables 5 and 6) by 
using only BUDGET as an instrument. According to the results of these new regressions, our major 
finding that public R&D funding increases privately funded R&D holds.  
Robustness test 2. Do our results change if we use public funding paid instead of public funding 
granted? To address this concern, we ran a model by using public funding paid as a regressor. Our 
estimations based on the alternative public funding variable showed that the coefficient of the public 
funding variable remains positive and statistically significant. We also re-ran the regressions in Table 
6. Again, our result that the impact of public funding on private R&D is smaller in the case of small 
firms (10% are small) holds. But in contrast to the results in column c (Table 6), when 25% of the 
smallest firms are classified as financially constrained, we did not find a statistically significant 
difference between the coefficient of large firms (75%) and small ones (25%). 
Robustness test 3. To what extent are our results specific to the period on which we focus? To address 
this question, we ran our models separately for the period 1997-99 and 2000-02. The results of these 
new regressions showed that our basic qualitative results hold: first, the coefficient of public R&D 
funding remained positive and statistically significant; second, this additionality effect is stronger in 
larger firms than in smaller ones.  
Robustness test 4. Does the exclusion of 5% of the largest firms as outliers bias our results concerning 
the difference between small and large firms? To test this concern, we re-ran models by excluding 
only 3% of the biggest firms. Again, our result that the impact of public funding on private R&D is 
smaller in the case of small firms holds.  
5  Discussion and conclusions 
This study analysed the impact of public R&D funding on privately financed R&D using data on 
Finnish firms during 1996-2002. Moreover, we studied the impact of financial constraint on the 
relationship between public and privately funded R&D.  
The findings of this paper do not support the view that public R&D funding crowds out privately 
financed R&D. Instead, our analysis suggests that receiving a positive decision to obtain public R&D 
funds increases privately financed R&D. Our results hold after we took into account the potential 
endogeneity of public funding. Moreover, our regressions suggest that a firm’s debt has a statistically 
significant negative but nonlinear effect on privately financed R&D. The results also (weakly) indicate 
that profit increases private R&D. 
This paper also contributes to the existing literature by analysing whether the impact of public R&D 
financing on private R&D is different in potentially financially constrained and unconstrained firms. 
To classify firms as financially constrained or unconstrained, we followed the fixed investment 
literature and used a firm size and the firms’ indebtedness as classification criteria. Our econometric 
results suggest that the additionality effect of public funding on private R&D is bigger in large firms 
than in small ones. Yet according to our results, there are no differences in the size of coefficient of 
public funding between indebted and non-indebted companies.  
The important policy implication of our results is that public R&D funding increases firms’ total R&D 
expenditure even in the case of non-financially constrained firms. Thus, our evidence does not support 
the view that the public sector should finance only financially constrained firms. It is, however, 
unclear how generally applicable our results are to other industries because our data consisted of 
companies operating only in one industry. Hence, a more extensive dataset is needed to obtain a more 
comprehensive conclusion about the impacts of public R&D funding. | 11 
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Appendix 
Data appendix  
The data related to financial reports came from Balance Consulting Ltd. and from Talouselämä 
magazine’s top 500 database. All variables are deflated using the GDP price index (1995=100). 
Total R&D expenditure: total R&D expenditure (irrespective of financing) of the firm as reported in 
the investment survey by the Confederation of Finnish Industry and Employers.  
Public R&D funding: this data came from the National Technology Agency (Tekes). Public 
funding includes R&D loans and subsidies.  
Privately financed R&D: privately financed R&D has been calculated by subtracting public 
R&D funding from the total R&D expenditure.  
Sales: net sales came directly from the income statements of firms.  
Profit: operating profit came directly from the income statements of firms. 
Debt: long-term debt came directly from the balance sheets of firms.  
Table A.1 Correlation matrix  
  Private 
R&Dt  
Public 
fundingt 
Public 
fundingt-1 
Net 
salest-1  Profitt-1 Debtt-1  (Debtt-1) 2  Budgett Budgett-1 
Private R&Dt    1.0000  –  – – – –  –  –  – 
Public 
fundingt  0.3664  1.0000  – – – –  –  –  – 
Public 
fundingt-1  0.4366  0.3416    1.0000 – – –  –  –  – 
Net salest-1 0.4389  0.1387  0.2137  1.0000  –  –  –  –  – 
Profitt-1 0.4765  0.1820  0.2730  0.7985  1.0000  –  –  –  – 
Debtt-1  0.3186  0.0902  0.1534 0.5906 0.6085 1.0000  –  –  – 
(Debtt-1) 2  0.2107 0.0252 0.0728  0.4046  0.4507 0.8975  1.0000  –  – 
Budgett 0.1678  0.3108  0.1182  0.0346  0.0673 -0.0371  -0.0710 1.0000  – 
Budgett-1 0.1455  0.0448  0.2252  0.0559  0.0770  -0.0011 -0.0129  0.0079 1.0000 
Table A.2 First-stage regressions (IV regressions in Table 5) 
  Column b in Table 5 Column c in Table 5
Dependent variable  Public fundingt Public fundingt-1
(Budget)t  .000688***   (.0002375) –
(Budget)t-1  – .0005255**   (.0002326)
(Applied)t  .3783243***   (.0032729) –
(Applied)t-1  – .3940916***   (.0032312)
Salest-1  -.0001083**   (.0000433) -.0000627   (.0000401)
Profitt-1  -.0001118   .0003354 -8.83e-06   (.0003104)
Long-term debtt-1  .00134**   (.0005969) .0005019   (.0005511)
(Long-term debt) 2
t-1  -.0000152 **  (7.64e-06) -.0000147**   (7.05e-06)
Constant  -.0203588   (.0131461) -.004774   (.0103988)
+ Year dummies  – –
Number of observations  1640 1640
F-test (joint)  1366.25 1503.27
      P-value  < 0.001 < 0.001
R
2  0.902 0.91
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